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In 2004, a major outbreak of hepatitis A among tourists
returning from Egypt involved 351 case-patients from 9
European countries who were infected with a single strain
(genotype 1b). The case-control study identified orange
juice as the most likely infection vehicle. Vaccination
against hepatitis A virus is strongly recommended before
travel to disease-endemic areas.
Nonimmune travelers to hepatitis A (HA)–endemiccountries carry a substantial risk of acquiring the dis-
ease, yet little is known about the epidemiology of HA
virus (HAV) infection in travel-associated outbreaks. In
Germany, approximately half of the 1,400–2,300 cases of
laboratory-confirmed HA reported annually since 2001
were acquired abroad. In mid-August 2004, infectious dis-
ease surveillance in Germany showed a strong increase of
HAV infections in tourists returning from Egypt, where
HA is highly endemic (1,2). The overwhelming majority
had stayed at hotel X in the Red Sea resort of Hurghada.
Prevention measures were implemented at the hotel (e.g.,
HA vaccination of guests). An outbreak investigation was
carried out.
The Study
The line listing of HA patients included persons with
laboratory evidence of recent HAV infection (anti-HAV
immunoglobulin M [IgM]) who stayed at hotel X after
June 1, 2004. Also listed were hotel guests with HA dis-
ease (jaundice, elevated liver enzyme levels), without lab-
oratory confirmation, who had traveled with persons with
laboratory-confirmed acute HAV infection.
A case-control study was performed among hotel X
guests >17 years of age residing in 3 German states. The
time span between the earliest arriving case-patient’s last
day at hotel X and the latest arriving case-patient’s first
day there was defined as the “minimum period of transmis-
sion” (MPT). Case-patients came from the line listing.
Healthy hotel guests who stayed at the hotel during the
MPT who had neither been vaccinated against HAV nor
previously infected with HAV were eligible as controls.
Telephone interviews were conducted with a standardized
questionnaire that elicited information on demographic
factors, foods and drink consumption, and participation in
recreational activities such as swimming, day trips, etc.
For statistical analysis, exposures were dichotomized
into “ever” versus “never,” and the “number of days
exposed” was calculated. Univariate analysis (χ2 tests) and
multiple logistic regression were performed (SPSS version
12.0.2, SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA); p<0.05 was consid-
ered statistically significant. The Egyptian authorities’
investigation included testing all hotel employees for HAV
antibodies (IgM, IgG), and scrutiny of food suppliers.
Serum samples were obtained from German case-patients
for testing by reverse transcription–PCR (RT-PCR) in the
VP1–2A junction and sequencing of a 160-bp-long PCR
fragment of the VP1 region.
The outbreak lasted from July 10 to September 8,
2004 (Figure 1). A total of 351 case-patients made up this
outbreak: 271 primary and 7 secondary infections in
Germany, plus 60 primary infections reported to the
national public health institutes in 8 other European coun-
tries. Austria recorded a secondary outbreak with 13 cases
caused by an infected food handler who had stayed at hotel
X (3). In preceding years, in Germany only 2–8 HA cases
were reported after travel to Egypt with disease onset
between July 10 and September 8.
Of the German reported primary cases, overt clinical
HA developed in 263 (97%) persons. Case-patients were 2
to 67 years of age (median 34 years) and 54% were male.
Overall, 47% of case-patients were hospitalized. Risk for
hospitalization rose with increasing age (p for trend =
0.001). The MPT lasted from June 24 to July 23 (Figure 1).
No more than 52% of the case-patients had stayed togeth-
er at the hotel on any single day. Case-patients had stayed
at hotel X from 6 to 21 days, and 70% had stayed 13 days
or longer.
Sixty-nine HA case-patients (60% response among the
115 case-patients in the 3 states) and 36 controls were
included in the statistical analysis. Eighty-seven percent of
the case-patients reported absence from work for 3 to 56
days (median 26 days), and 54% of the case-patients were
hospitalized for 2 to 25 days (median 9 days).
DISPATCHES
156 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 13, No. 1, January 2007
*Robert Koch Institute, Berlin, Germany; †Institute of Public
Health, State of North-Rhine Westphalia, Münster, Germany;
‡Hesse State Health Office, State of Hesse, Dillenburg, Germany;
§State Health Authority, State of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Stuttgart,
Germany; and ¶Ministry of Health and Population, Cairo, Egypt
Case-patients and controls did not differ significantly
by age, sex, recreational activities, consumption of ice
cream or salads, or other foods consumed, or behavioral
characteristics. Case-patients were significantly more like-
ly to have drunk orange juice served at the breakfast buf-
fet (82%) than were controls (64%) (odds ratio 2.6; 95%
confidence interval 1.1–6.6). In multivariate analysis, no
other exposures were retained. A dose-response relation-
ship became apparent between number of days of orange
juice consumption and HA (Figure 2). Case-patients con-
sumed orange juice for a median of 11 days, and controls
consumed it for a median of 5 days. In 22 (52%) of the 42
serum samples available for testing, HAV RNA was iden-
tified. All samples compared by sequencing were identical
and belonged to genotype 1b (Figure 3).
The on-site investigations in Egypt did not identify
hotel staff positive for HAV IgM. Minimal fluctuation
among hotel staff renders it unlikely that an HAV-positive
employee was missed. Investigations at the orange juice
producing plant found significant hygiene problems. In
addition, the finished product did not undergo heat treat-
ment. This producer did not cater to other hotel chains in
Hurghada.
Conclusions
This large outbreak demonstrates risk and clinical
impact of HA for nonimmune travelers to HA-endemic
countries. In Germany, the outbreak accounted for 12% of
all HA case-patients notified in the year 2004.
The results of the outbreak investigation strongly
point to orange juice as the infection vehicle. In the case-
control study, among a broad range of foodstuff, bever-
ages, and recreational activities queried, the consumption
of orange juice was the only exposure significantly associ-
ated with HA, with higher doses of juice significantly
increasing HA risk. These findings are corroborated by the
inspection of the hygienic conditions under which the juice
was produced in Egypt. The juice was most likely contam-
inated during the manufacturing process, e.g., by an infect-
ed worker with imperfect hand hygiene or by contact of
fruit or machinery with sewage-contaminated water.
Citrus fruit and citrus juices have only rarely been
implicated as vehicles of HA outbreaks, with contamina-
tion typically described during preparation just before con-
sumption (4,5). Salmonella outbreaks caused by orange
juice contaminated at the production site have been identi-
fied (6–8). As HAV is quite resistant to acid (9), it likely
survives for prolonged periods in orange juice. Less stable
pathogens such as Escherichia coli have been shown to
survive in orange juice for >15 days (10).
The fact that juice was consumed by 60% of healthy
controls may be explained in part by fluctuating virus con-
centration within the juice, which resulted in varying
degrees of infectiousness during the 4-week period. A con-
taminated lot may have been phased-in and out slowly by
gradual mixture with other lots. Also, the study design did
not allow the exclusion of controls who did not know they
were immune.
The Hurghada outbreak-strain clearly differs from
strains that have caused nontravel-associated outbreaks in
Germany in recent years. Two large autochthonous out-
breaks were caused by HAV type 1a strains (11). In the
Netherlands, HAV strains in autochthonous cases mostly
also belonged to HAV 1a, whereas 1b strains were found
more often in children of Moroccan origin (12). Extended
monitoring of HAV strains, for example, as performed in
the United States (13), could find hidden clusters and
demonstrate links between imported and autochthonous
cases. Similar monitoring should be introduced in
Germany.
Vaccination against HA is recommended for all non-
immune travelers to HA-endemic areas (14). This outbreak
showed that a high proportion of German tourists in Egypt
were either not adequately informed about HA risk and the
benefits of vaccination or were informed yet still decided
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Figure 1. Epidemic curve: distri-
bution of dates of disease onset
for outbreak-associated hepatitis
A case-patients from Germany
(n = 264), and minimum period
during which hepatitis A virus
transmission occurred (MPT). 
Figure 2. Days of orange juice consumption among hepatitis A
patients and controls. OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval. 
against vaccination. The outbreak emphasizes the impor-
tance of adequate pretravel advice, preferably from an
institution specialized in travel medicine. Travel agencies
should incorporate adequate immunization advice into
their catalogs.
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Figure 3. Phylogenetic analysis of the VP1-2A junction region. The
sequence of a 160-bp-long PCR fragment (isolate Egy/1/05/DEU,
GenBank accession no. AY741663) of the hepatitis A VP1 region
was compared to published reference sequences of hepatis A
virus. Genotype Ia: GenBank accession nos. AJ306374(Arg-1),
AY656712 (BAV/2/03/DEU*), AY028976 (SA/10/2000/DEU),
AY046073 (Datteln/01/DEU), and AY747173 (NRW/3/04/DEU*).
Genotype Ib: L07728 (Jor 88), M14707 (HM-175). The scale rep-
resents nucleotide substitutions per position; * denotes previous
German outbreak-causing strains. 
